WebFeb 1, 2024 · Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that the sender perfectly knows receiver's payoffs. The first crucial step towards such an achievement is … WebBayesian persuasion, introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), revolves around influencing the behav-ior of self-interested agents through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Differently from traditional mecha-nism design, where the designer influences the outcome by providing tangible incentives, in Bayesian persuasion
Bayesian Inference - Introduction to Machine Learning - Wolfram
WebBayesian Persuasion by Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow. Published in volume 101, issue 6, pages 2590-2615 of American Economic Review, October 2011, Abstract: When … Webpersuasion whenever (i) Receiver does not take Sender’s preferred action by default (in a sense we make precise below) and (ii) Receiver’s action is constant in some neighborhood of beliefs around ... a form of Bayesian persuasion to study self-signaling and self-regulation. Caillaud and Tirole (2007) rely on a similar mechanism to study ... psc sedlcany
How to Get People to Do What You Want Them to Do - New York …
WebThe Persuasion Duality* Piotr Dworczak and Anton Kolotilin First draft: October 24, 2024 Current draft: July 13, 2024 Abstract We present a uni ed duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. WebMulti-Receiver Online Bayesian Persuasion All the proofs omitted from the paper are in the Appendix. 1.2. Related Works Most of the computational works on Bayesian persuasion study (offline) models in which the sender knowns the receiver’s utility function exactly. Dughmi & Xu (2016) initiate these studies with the single receiver case, while WebPERSUASION APPROACH* Jun Zhang and Junjie Zhou We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two-player contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private information. The contest organiser can precommit to a signal to influence the uninformed contestant's belief about horse riding on the beach cape town prices